Abstract: Philosophers in ancient China early realized that a semantic triangle composed of symbol, expositor, and object was not a perfect expression system: symbolic system whose perceptive and physical attributes break away from object can not completely denote the object per se. Some objects such as “Dao”,“Xuan” etc ,which signify ontology of object, are hard to be thoroughly denoted due to their universality and supra- temporality. In the history of philosophy in China, many philosophical schools including confucian, Daoist, Moist, Faist, Mingist, zaiist, and buddhist looked at symbolic plight from their own standpoints, and over a long debate a special intersection mode had been engendered, leading to a breakthrough of China's symbol from plight. In addition, the propositions such as Xing-Ming, Wu- Wo, Yan-Yi in the China's symbolic intersection mode, are important issues in China's poetics.
从图示可以看出,符号、对象、解释者三者之间分别构成指示关系、表达关系和反映关系,形成一个完满自足的语义三角。
中国古代哲学家很早就认识到符号、解释者、对象之间的语义三角并非一个完整的体系。《吕氏春秋》中有一则故事:“荆柱国庄伯令其父‘视日。’曰:‘在天。’‘视其奚如?’曰:‘正圆。’‘视其时。’曰:‘当今。’”(《吕氏春秋·淫词》)在这则故事中,庄伯的意图无法让仆人明白,也就是说,解释者与符号之间的表达关系受到了阻碍与扭曲,解释者的符号无法被接受者还原为对象。还有一则故事:“空雄之遇,秦赵相与约。约曰:‘自今以来,秦之所欲为,赵助之;赵之所欲为,秦助之。’居无几何,秦兴兵攻魏,赵欲救之。秦王不说,使人让赵王曰:‘约曰“秦之所欲为,赵助之;赵之所欲为,秦助之”,今秦欲攻魏,而赵因欲救之,此非约也。’赵王以告平原君。平原君以告公孙龙。公孙龙曰:‘亦可以发使而让秦王曰:“赵欲救之,今秦王独不助赵,此非约也。”’(《吕氏春秋·淫词》)在这个故事中,同样一个符号,不同的解释者还原为不同的对象,符号与对象之间没有形成固定的指示关系。洛克说,文字的缺点在其意义含混(doubtfulness and ambiguity)。[②]
[②] “Theimperfection of words is the doubtfulness or ambiguity of their signification, which is caused by the sort of ideas they stand for..”John Locke. Of the Imperfection of Words. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,2(3):105. Dover Publications, Inc. New York.
[④] 白马非马论与西方一个蝙蝠究竟是否是一只鸟的争论颇为相似。“Whether a bat be a bird or no, is not aquestion.” John Locke. Remedies of the Foregoing Imperfections andAbuse of Words. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,2(3): 150.
[⑤] 汤用彤:《魏晋玄学论稿》,上海古籍出版社2001年版。第21页。
[⑥] J. N. Mohanty , phenomenology and ontology, ⅵ. Martinus Nijhoff Den Haag,( 1970): 60-71.
[⑦] John Locke: Imperfection of Words. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,Dover Publications, Inc. New York, 2:104-5.
[⑧] 奥格登(C·K·Ogden)和理查兹(I·A·Richards)将语言的功能分为符号功能和情绪功能两大类。他们假定语词能指称对象或表达使用者的感情,意义只存在于前一种能力中。威廉·哈迪(William·G·Hardy)认为把词划分为指称词语和情绪语词,其用途是相当有限的,而且可能不象对语言和思想问题的其它几种研究那样可靠。WilliamG·Hard, Language, thought and Experience: A Tapestry of The Meaning,University Park Press, Baltomore, pp. 61—97.